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It is important for the design of tax policy to be able to measure reliably the income 
elasticity of tax revenue.  This gives the extent to which tax revenues change as a result 
of a change in earnings.  Analytical expressions for income tax revenue elasticities treat 
earnings as exogenous, so that they do not accommodate the endogenous response of 
labour supply to the income tax system. This paper shows how these expression can be 
adapted to allow for endogenous labour supply. It identifies how far, and in what 
circumstances, labour supply effects are quantitatively important for revenue 
responsiveness estimates, both for individual taxpayers and in aggregate. It is shown that 
even a relatively simple tax-benefit structure can produce labour supply responses which 
considerably alter tax revenue elasticity calculations. It is shown that , even with modest 
leisure preferences, tax-wage elasticities are significantly higher that tax-income 
elasticities.   
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It is important for the design of tax policy to be able to measure reliably the
income elasticity of tax revenue. For example, given some revenue target, the
need for discretionary changes in tax parameters (such as tax rates, income
thresholds and allowances) is conditional on the expected automatic revenue
growth generated by the system’s built-in ﬂexibility. In the context of aggregate
revenue over all individuals, the extent to which the aggregate eﬀective average
tax rate changes when total income changes depends on a number of factors
including the precise distribution of individual income changes associated with
the aggregate change.
The literature on the built-in ﬂexibility of taxation has concentrated on the
analysis of tax revenue elasticities with respect to income growth at the individual
and aggregate level. Approaches have been based on regression methods, simu-
lation models, or calculations using analytical expressions.1 These methods are
statistical in that there is no modelling of economic behaviour; they treat income
changes as exogenous. If it is required to consider the eﬀects on revenue growth
of wage changes, for example arising from productivity growth, the elasticities
with respect to income provide only part of the story.
The elasticity of revenue with respect to the wage rate depends on both
the revenue elasticity with respect to income and the elasticity of income with
respect to the wage. Furthermore, the latter is a function of the elasticity of
hours worked with respect to the wage rate. When the tax-wage relationship is
of interest, it is therefore necessary to consider how a change in wages aﬀects
labour-leisure choices, given the existing tax schedule.2 Changes in wage rates
and gross incomes may be quite diﬀerent, especially in the neighbourhood of
income thresholds in piecewise linear tax structures.
This paper explores the income tax revenue responsiveness arising from wage
changes. It shows how analytical expressions can be extended to incorporate
endogenous labour supply responses. Simulation methods are used to examine
revenue elasticities in the face of highly nonlinear tax structures, where multiple
local optima may exist and large discrete jumps in labour supply can arise from
non-convex ranges of budget sets. An objective is to identify how far, and in what
circumstances, labour supply eﬀects can alter revenue responsiveness estimates
that are typically computed for individual taxpayers and in aggregate.
Section 2 provides the relevant analytics of labour supply in the presence of a
piecewise linear (multi-step) income tax and transfer structure. Section 3 shows
how the revenue elasticities with respect to income and wages are related to each
1For a review of analytical expressions and references to alternative methods, see Creedy
and Gemmell (2002).
2To the extent that there is any automatic indexation of tax thresholds, these are usually
in relation to income, rather than wage changes.
1other and to labour supply elasticities at the individual level. Section 4 presents
some numerical examples while Section 5 turns to aggregate revenue elasticities.
Brief conclusions are in section 6.
2 Labour Supply
The simplest approach to the analysis of labour supply involves the static max-
imisation of a (single period) direct utility function, U (c,h), where h and c
represent hours worked and consumption (or net income, where the price index
is normalised to unity), subject to a budget constraint. Unlike the standard com-
modity demand model in which prices are constant irrespective of the amount of
each good consumed, the individual faces a variety of net wage rates. Although
the gross wage is assumed to remain constant (independent of the number of
hours worked), varying eﬀective marginal tax rates associated with the piecewise
linear nature of the budget constraint mean that the net wage varies with h. The
actual net wage depends on the chosen position on the budget constraint and is
therefore, like the number of hours worked, endogenous.
With a piecewise linear budget constraint any interior (or tangency) solu-
tion and corner solution can be regarded as being generated by a simple linear
constraint of the form:
c = wnh + µ (1)
In the case of such tangency solutions, wn and µ represent the appropriate
net wage rate and ‘virtual’ income respectively. Virtual income is the intercept
(where h =0 )corresponding to the relevant segment of the budget constraint
and associated net wage; it is therefore distinct from actual non-wage income.
In the case of a corner solution, the appropriate virtual income is deﬁned as the
value generated by a linear constraint having a net wage, the virtual wage, equal
to the slope of the indiﬀerence curve at the kink. The concept of the virtual
wage is the same as that of the virtual price used in the theory of rationing.
labour supply modelling requires the full tax and beneﬁts y s t e m ,w h i c hd e -
termines individuals’ budget sets, to be speciﬁed. Any piecewise linear tax and
transfer system can be described by a number of eﬀective marginal tax rates
and gross earnings values at which the marginal rates change. Subsection 2.1
discusses individual budget constraints, while subsection 2.2 brieﬂy states the
main results for the special case of Cobb-Douglas utility functions. This form
is chosen merely for convenience of presentation in order to illustrate the basic
properties of the models.3
3The computer program used to provide simulation results below also allows for CES utility
functions. Copies of this program are available from the authors.
22.1 Budget Constraints
A piecewise linear tax and transfer system, without discontinuities, can be deﬁned
in terms of K gross income thresholds, ak, and eﬀective marginal tax rates
applying above those thresholds, tk, for k =1 ,...,K. The initial threshold, a1,
is equal to zero. This subsection explains how the thresholds and rates can be
converted to a budget constraint for an individual facing a given gross wage rate.
Attention is restricted to the case where earnings from employment and transfer
payments are the only sources of income.
Given a gross wage rate, w, the thresholds and rates must be transformed
into a set of virtual incomes, mk, and net wages, w(1 − tk), which describe
respectively the intercept and the slope of each of the K linear segments of the
budget constraint.
The virtual income at the start of the ﬁrst segment of the budget constraint,
m1, must be known. This corresponds to net income when the individual does
not work. If there are no transfer payments, then m1 is set to zero. Along the
kth linear segment, wn = w(1 − tk) and net income, z = c, corresponding to h
hours of work is given, from (1), as:
z = mk + w(1 − tk)h (2)
Let h∗
k denote the hours of work for which gross earnings are equal to the
speciﬁed gross earnings thresholds. Clearly, h∗
1 =0 ,a n df o rk>1,g i v e nt h a t
two adjacent segments k and k − 1 must intersect at point h∗
k (assuming that
there are no discontinuities), it must be true that:
mk + w(1 − tk)h
∗
k = mk−1 + w(1 − tk−1)h
∗
k (3)







Next, consider the net incomes at the earnings thresholds. For k =1 ,a 1 =0 ,
and z = m1. At a2 net income is m1 + a2(1 − t1) and for k =3 ,...,K:
z = m1 +
k−1 X
j=2
aj (tj − tj−1)+ak (1 − tk−1) (5)
Equating these with the corresponding values of mk−1 + w(1 − tk−1)h∗
k, and
substituting for h∗
k from (4), it can be seen that, for k =2 ,...,K:
mk = mk−1 + ak(tk − tk−1) (6)
The piecewise linear budget constraint for any value of w, corresponding to
ag i v e ns e to fak and tk (along with m1) is thus fully deﬁned. Furthermore,
the net tax paid can be expressed in terms of the diﬀerence between gross
earnings and net income at the corresponding level of hours worked, h, and
is y − {mk + w(1 − tk)h}.
32.2 Cobb-Douglas Utility Functions
Suppose an individual is on the kth segment with virtual income of mk and
marginal tax rate of tk. If preferences are Cobb-Douglas, with consumption (net
income) of c and time spent in work of h, from a total of H available hours:
U (c,h)=c
α (H − h)
1−α (7)
In this context, it is most convenient to write the budget constraint in terms of
‘full income’, M, deﬁned as the maximum amount the individual could obtain
(and consume) by working all available hours. Hence:
M = w(1 − tk)H + mk (8)
The individual is thus considered to convert the endowment of time, H, into full
income, which is used to purchase goods (having a price normalised to unity)
and leisure at the eﬀective price of w(1 − tk).
The standard Cobb-Douglas result gives, for a gross wage rate of w, ad e m a n d
for leisure of:





h = αH −
mk (1 − α)
w(1 − tk)
(10)
Furthermore, gross earnings, y = wh, in the relevant range are:
y = αwH −
mk (1 − α)
(1 − tk)
(11)
In this context the value of h is jointly determined along with the segment, giving
the values of mk and tk, or the relevant corner of the budget constraint.
If marginal eﬀective tax rates always increase, there is only one local optimum.
However, if the budget set has non-convex ranges where the marginal tax rate
declines, determination of the optimal solution is complicated by the possibility
of more than one local optimum and the existence of a threshold wage rate at
which the individual makes a large discrete jump from one section of the budget
constraint to another. This possibility arises where transfer systems are means-
tested, so that in practice an eﬃcient algorithm is needed for determining all
local optima; for further discussion of this case, see Creedy (2001) and Creedy
and Duncan (2002).
43 Individual Elasticities
To see how endogenous labour supply aﬀects tax revenue elasticities, it is helpful
to begin with some basic relationships among various elasticities. Then the
special case of an income tax only is investigated which allows comparison with
standard built-in ﬂexibility results.
3.1 Basic Relationships
The tax paid by an individual i, who has a gross wage rate, wi,a n di so nt h e
kth linear segment of the budget constraint, with resulting income yi = wihi,i s
expressed as:
T (yi)=T (yi (wi)) (12)
The elasticity of T (yi) with respect to the wage rate, referred to as the ‘tax-wage
elasticity’, can be expressed as:
ηT,w = ηT,yηy,w (13)
where ηy,w is the elasticity of earnings with respect to the wage. The standard









where mtri is the marginal tax rate and atri is the average tax rate faced by i.
Furthermore, using yi = wihi, the elasticity ηy,w can be expressed as:
ηy,w =1+ηh,w (15)
giving:
ηT,w = ηT,y(1 + ηh,w) (16)
Although ηT,y is endogenous, it is useful to express (16) in this way because
ηT,y is typically estimated from Inland Revenue data on incomes and tax revenues.
Thus, together with estimates of ηh,w, the tax-wage elasticity may be obtained.
3.2 An Income Tax Only
Consider the simple case where there is only an income tax and suppose there
are no transfer payments, so that m1 =0 . Consider the multi-step tax function
deﬁned by:
T (yi)= 0 0 <y i ≤ a1
= t1 (yi − a1) a1 <y i ≤ a2
= t1 (a2 − a1)+t2 (yi − a2) a2 <y i ≤ a3
(17)
5and so on. If yi falls into the kth tax bracket, so that ak <y i ≤ ak+1, and
a0 = t0 =0 ,T(yi) can be written for k ≥ 1 as:
T (yi)=tk (yi − ak)+
k−1 X
j=0
tj (aj+1 − aj) (18)




aj (tj − tj−1) (19)
Hence:























The implication of (20) and (21) is that the tax function facing an individual
taxpayer within the kth segment is equivalent to a tax function with a single
marginal tax rate, tk, applied to income measured in excess of a single threshold,
a0
k.T h et e r m ,a0
k, is the eﬀective threshold for individuals in the kth class, and
is a weighted sum of the ajs, with weights,
tj−tj−1
tk , determined by the structure
of marginal rate progression. Therefore, a
0
k diﬀers across individuals, unlike aj,
depending on the marginal income tax bracket, yik, into which they fall. Hence




From (11) it can be shown, using the abbreviations: a = a
0



















0.5 0.046 0.261 1.331 1.391 0.034 1.046
0.7 0.027 0.257 1.331 1.367 0.021 1.027
where (11) may be used to substitute for y.
Equation (24) is the simplest income tax revenue elasticity, derived by Creedy
and Gemmell (2002), for the exogenous labour supply case where the ajsa r e
ﬁxed. However, in many income tax systems, a number of deductions are income-
related so that da/dy > 0. Allowing for this possibility, Creedy and Gemmell





where ηa,y is the elasticity of allowances with respect to income. Using (16)
allows this to be expressed as:
ηT,y =
y(1 + ηh,w) − aηa,w




y(1 + ηh,w) − aηa,w
(y − a)
(27)
These expressions show clearly how the tax-income and tax-wage elasticities can
both be decomposed into components associated with the labour supply elasticity,
ηh,w, and the elasticity of income tax allowances with respect to wages, ηa,w.
To illustrate possible values, consider an individual earning gross income of
y = $17,000 per year, paying a marginal tax rate of t =0 .23, with a0 =5 2 0 0
and ηa,y =0 .25.4 Substitution into equations (16), (26) and (27) yields the
values shown in Table 3, for values of α =0 .5 and α =0 .7. The resulting
labour supply eﬀects on the tax revenue elasticity are small, causing ηT,y to
underestimate ηT,w by about 3-5 per cent, or 6 percentage points.
The small labour supply eﬀects in column 2 are broadly in line with the empir-
ical estimates available for the UK which generally ﬁnd small positive elasticities
for men.5 However, potentially larger eﬀects on revenue elasticities are to be
4These values approximate those corresponding to average income and the tax structure in
the UK in the early 1990s; See Creedy and Gemmell (2002).
5See, for example, Blundell and Walker (1982), Blundell, Duncan and Maghir (1998).
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) provide a review of empirical estimates.
7Table 2: Tax Structure
Income Tax Tax/Transfer
Threshold MTR Threshold EMTR
00 00 . 5 0
80 0.10 130 0.10
180 0.23 180 0.23
600 0.40 600 0.40
expected for individuals closer to relevant tax thresholds and for aggregate rev-
enue elasticities where a suﬃciently large proportion of the wage distribution is
aﬀected by these thresholds. The following section explores individual eﬀects
further using a more detailed model containing a means-tested transfer payment
in addition to income taxation.
4 Some Numerical Examples
In practice, tax and transfer systems display considerable complexity and must
deal with problems of population heterogeneity. However, to illustrate the wide
range of possible labour supply responses and resulting tax revenue elasticities it
is suﬃcient to analyse a simple tax and transfer system.
4.1 The Tax and Transfer System
The simulations reported here combine an income tax involving four marginal
t a xr a t e sa n dt h r e s h o l d s ,s h o w ni nw e e k l yt e r m si nt h el e f t - h a n ds e c t i o no fT a b l e
2; these values, suitably annualised, approximate the UK income tax structure
around the year 2000. These numerical examples are nevertheless purely illustra-
tive. Indeed, the beneﬁt structure is assumed to take a highly simpliﬁed form, in
which non-workers receive a weekly beneﬁt, b, giving the initial virtual income,
m1 = b. There is an eﬀective marginal tax rate, s, i m p o s e do nr e l a t i v e l yl o w
earned incomes, such that net income, z, is given by z = b +( 1− s)y.E l i g i b l e
individuals have their net incomes brought up to this level. Hence for those with
y2 >y>y 1 =0 , who work but face a marginal income tax rate of zero, the
beneﬁt they receive is equal to b − sy.
Those with earnings in the range y>y 2, and who therefore pay income tax
and receive a transfer, have after-tax incomes given by z = y2 +( 1− t2)(y −
y2)=t2y2 +( 1− t2)y. Hence the social transfer received by such individuals
is equal to b − y(s − t2) − t2ys. This becomes zero at the income level y0 =
(b − t2y2)/(s − t2). Hence y0 becomes a new eﬀective threshold, whereby only
8those with y<y 0 receive any beneﬁts, and those with y3 >y>y 0 pay income
tax at the marginal rate t2 and receive no beneﬁts.
Hence if s =0 .5 and b =6 0 , the eﬀective tax structure has an earnings
threshold of y0 =1 3 0p e rw e e k ,a b o v ew h i c ht h em a r g i n a lt a xr a t ei s0.10
a n db e l o ww h i c hi ti s0.5. This ensures that the overall tax structure has no
discontinuities. The eﬀective structure is thus given on the right-hand side of
Table 2, with an initial virtual income of m1 =6 0 .6
4.2 Labour Supply
The eﬀective tax structure shown on the right hand side of Table 2 has a range
where the implied budget set for each individual is non-convex, giving rise to
a large discrete ‘jump’ in labour supply at a particular ‘switching’ wage. This
switching wage is lower than the value that is associated with the earnings thresh-
old of y0; indeed, the non-convexity implies that earnings in a range around y0
would not be observed. The labour supply curve, for a given value of α, can be
generated numerically using the results presented in subsection 2.2 for a Cobb-
Douglas utility function. An eﬃcient algorithm is used to determine the optimal
labour supply for each individual.7
The potential importance of labour supply eﬀects for revenue elasticities can
be seen from the labour supply curve in Figure 3, which applies to an individual
with α =0 .5. This reveals a number of kinks and segments associated with the
various tax and beneﬁt thresholds and the switching wage where a jump is made
from the ﬁrst to the second segment. The individual does not begin working
until the wage of w =1 .5 is reached. Below this level the full beneﬁto f6 0i s
obtained. As soon as the individual starts to work, the eﬀective marginal tax
rate of 0.5 applies.
For a wage rate above 3.52 the individual begins to pay income tax and
simultaneously receives a beneﬁt. Labour supply is therefore relatively elastic
over this range. The wage of approximately 3.96 is found to be the switching
wage that is associated with a substantial jump in hours worked (from 24.77 to
38.88 hours). This involves a jump to the next segment of the budget constraint,
so that the individual no longer receives any beneﬁt and there is a consequent
drop in the eﬀective marginal tax rate (from 0.5 to 0.1).
Above the switching wage, labour supply is relatively inelastic, except for
backward-bending segments associated with kinks in the budget constraint (where
marginal rates fall) at the two highest income tax thresholds of y =1 8 0and 600.
At these kink points, ηh,w = −1 so that ηy,w =0over the range of wage rates for
6The recently introduced Working Families Tax Credit in the UK, where s =0 .55,l e a d st o
beneﬁts being received by some households paying the standard tax rate.
7For a description of the algorithm used, which allows for the possibility of multiple local






















Figure 1: Individual Labour Supply Curve
which the kinks are optimal. Gross earnings remain constant at the relevant in-
come threshold as the wage rate increases, with each of these backward-bending
labour supply curve segments forming part of rectangular hyperbolas.
4.3 Revenue Elasticities
Figures 2 and 3 show the associated revenue elasticity proﬁles.8 In Figure 2,
ηT,w is compared with the equivalent proﬁle for the case where labour supply
is exogenous.9 Figure 3 compares ηT,w with ηT,y for the endogenous labour
supply case. Figure 2 reveals that ignoring endogenous labour supply responses
leads to ηT,y underestimating ηT,w except at corner solutions where ηT,w =0
in the endogenous case, but the exogenous case leads to positive values. In the
exogenous labour supply case, ηT,y exceeds ηT,w, particularly at low wage levels,
because the lower gross earnings associated with responses to the tax-beneﬁt
system are ignored.
With such diﬀerences between the two proﬁles, especially at wages below
around $5 per hour, it is unclear how aggregate elasticities based on a wage
8The elasticities were computed by increasing w by a small amount, 0.2%, at each step,
and recalculating optimal labour supply and taxation.
9The zero labour supply case is obtained by setting the exogenous level of hours worked at















































































































































































elast.T,w (no LS effect; 39hrs)
Figure 2: Tax-Wage Elasticities
distribution might be aﬀected. Figure 3 shows that, given endogenous labour
supply, ηT,y can be expected to be less than ηT,w at all wage rates except at
corners where both ηT,w and ηT,y are zero. Both elasticities can be very large
for individuals immediately above tax thresholds. However, it can be seen that
positively valued elasticities are generally in the range of 1 to 3.
Figure 4 shows the ratio of the tax-wage and tax-income elasticities, providing
an indication of the extent of underestimation at diﬀerent wage levels if ηT,y is
used as a proxy for ηT,w. Apart from low wage levels, where ηT,w can exceed
ηT,y by as much as 70-80 per cent, for most wage rates ηT,w exceeds ηT,y by less
than 20 per cent, and more typically by less than 10 per cent.
4.4 Beneﬁt Elasticities
Figure 5 provides information about the variation in the beneﬁt elasticity, that
is, the responsiveness of transfer expenditures to changes in wage rates. This
is negative, reﬂecting the withdrawal of beneﬁts as wages rates rise, and values
obviously depend on the eﬀective marginal rate applied (0.5 in this case). The
elasticity changes from around −0.5, when the beneﬁt taper begins to apply, to
around −3.5 when income tax becomes payable. This temporarily increases the
beneﬁt elasticity which continues to fall thereafter until beneﬁts are completely

















































































































































































withdrawn tax threshold @ £180 p.w.
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Figure 5: Individual Beneﬁt Elasticity
budget constraint). These values suggest that, even with a fairly modest taper
rate of 0.5, the beneﬁt elasticity can be large in absolute value, causing transfer
expenditures to decline relatively quickly as wage rates rise.
5 Aggregate Elasticities
This section examines aggregate revenue elasticities. The ﬁrst subsection presents
the basic concepts and the second subsection reports simulation results.
5.1 Basic Relationships
For a continuous wage rate distribution, where the distribution function is F (w),
total tax revenue, TY, can be expressed as:
TY =
Z
T (y(w))dF (w) (28)
The elasticity of aggregate revenue, with respect to a change in the arithmetic







13where ηw,W is the elasticity of w with respect to the average wage. In the
equiproportional case where all wage rates change in equal proportions, ηw,W =








The further analysis of equation (30) must allow for the number of diﬀerent
linear segments in the tax function, each having a diﬀerent mk and tk, and the
wage thresholds over which each combination is applicable. As mentioned above,
for those who are in ranges of w that place them at corners, small changes in w
have no eﬀect on y, so ηy,w =0over that range. In general it would be extremely
complex to derive the precise thresholds since, for example, the switching wage
cannot be obtained explicitly except for very simple utility functions.10 For this
reason, simulation methods are used in this section where revenue elasticities
are based on a random sample of individuals drawn from a speciﬁed wage rate
distribution.
5.2 Simulation Results
Simulation of the aggregate tax revenue elasticity requires a form for the wage
distribution. The following examples are based on the use of a lognormal distri-
bution, Λ(µ,σ2),w h e r eµ and σ2 are respectively the mean and variance of the
logarithms of hourly wage rates. Values of µ =2 .0 and σ2 =0 .5 were chosen,
giving a mean hourly wage rate of exp(µ + 1
2σ2)=9 .49. Results are reported
for a random sample of 5000 individuals drawn from this distribution.11 For
convenience, simulations assume a common value of the preference parameter,
α, across all individuals, though in practice this may vary if, for example, high
wages are associated with a lower leisure preference.12
Table 2 shows values of both ηTY ,W and ηTY ,Y for alternative values of α,
together with the ratio, ηTY ,W/ηTY ,Y. Column 5 provides an alternative measure
of the degree of underestimation arising from the use of ηTY ,W as a proxy for
ηTY ,Y. This measures the ratio of the proportionate change in tax revenues









example, with α =0 .5, column 4 indicates that the aggregate tax-wage elasticity
is approximately 9 per cent greater than the tax-income elasticity. However,
10For further analysis of switching wage rates, see Creedy (1996).
11Simulations excluded the small number of individuals for whom the small wage increase
(of 0.2%) led to a large discrete jump in labour supply from the ﬁr s tt ot h es e c o n ds e g m e n to f
the budget constraint, or a move from a corner to a tangency solutions. Elasticities for these
individuals are disproportionately large.
12Creedy (2001) discusses the appropriate simulation method for the case where w and α
are jointly lognormally distributed.
14Table 3: Aggregate Elasticities





0.1 2.095 1.844 1.14 1.31
0.3 1.776 1.597 1.11 1.30
0.5 1.636 1.502 1.09 1.27
0.7 1.544 1.463 1.06 1.18
0.9 1.468 1.442 1.02 1.06
1.0 1.426 1.426 1.00 1.00
column 5 shows that this implies that tax revenue increases using ηTY ,W, for
a given increase in wage rates, are around 27 per cent greater than would be
obtained using ηTY ,Y.F o r α =1 , there are no labour supply eﬀects and both
elasticities are identical.
Two features stand out in Table 2. Firstly, allowing for endogenous labour
supply has a noticeable eﬀect on the magnitudes of both elasticity measures:
ηTY ,W rises from 1.4 to 2.1 as α is reduced from 1.0 to 0.1, with a slightly
smaller increase in ηTY ,Y. Secondly, the extent to which ηTY ,W exceeds the more
commonly calculated ηTY ,Y also depends on the nature of leisure preferences.
With a strong preference for consumption (high α) the increase in tax revenues
is only about 6 per cent higher using ηTY ,W compared with the use of ηTY ,Y,
whereas with a stronger leisure preference (low α), this ﬁgure is around 30 per
cent. This suggests that the accurate measurement of ηTY ,W in practice is likely
to require an allowance for population heterogeneity.
6 Conclusions
This paper has suggested that the usual practice of estimating the revenue re-
sponsiveness of income tax using the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to
income (earnings) may be misleading as a guide to how tax revenue responds
to changes in wage rates. Until now, analytical expressions for these elasticities
have typically treated earnings as exogenous, so that they do not accommodate
the endogenous response of labour supply to the income tax system. This paper
has shown how revenue elasticity expression can be adapted to allow for endoge-
nous labour supply. The primary objective was to identify how far, and in what
circumstances, labour supply eﬀects are quantitatively important for revenue re-
sponsiveness estimates, both for individual taxpayers and in aggregate.
Analytical elasticity expressions in section 3 showed the importance of the
income tax structure (tax rates and thresholds), the elasticity of income tax
allowances with respect to wages, ηa,w, and the labour supply elasticity, ηh,w.T h e
15last of these is, in turn, a function of the tax structure and leisure preferences, in
addition to the wage structure. In order to quantify these various determinants,
a numerical exercise was used based on a stylised version of the UK income tax
and transfer system. For individuals, this showed that even a relatively simple
tax-beneﬁt structure can produce labour supply responses which considerably
alter tax revenue elasticity calculations. Especially for individuals on low wages
where income taxes and transfers interact, and for those close to income tax
thresholds, tax-income elasticities can severely misrepresent tax-wage responses.
At most wage levels, however, and with modest leisure preferences (α =0 .5),
tax-wage elasticities were between 3 per cent and 17 p e rc e n th i g h e rt h a nt a x -
income elasticities, when allowing for endogenous labour supply.
Aggregate tax revenue elasticities were also computed for a simulated sample
of individuals, using a lognormal distribution of wage rates. The results suggested
that, in aggregate, tax-income elasticities may provide a reasonable approxima-
tion of tax-wage responses but only in the presence of a strong preference for
consumption over leisure. With α around 0.5 or lower, aggregate income tax
revenue growth associated with a given increase in wage rates can be as much as
30 per cent greater than the response of tax revenues to earned incomes. Recent
estimates of the labour supply responses of men on average in the UK are gen-
erally small and positive, which might suggest that an exogeneity assumption is
a reasonable approximation when estimating tax elasticities. However, it is also
known that labour supply responses for particular groups of individuals (such as
women, pension recipients, and low-wage men) can diﬀer widely.13 This suggests
that empirical estimation of tax revenue elasticities may have to be aware of the
diﬀerential impact of wage growth for diﬀerent types of individual. Unlike the
computation of standard income tax revenue elasticities, which requires only in-
formation about the tax structure and the income distribution, a full evaluation
of the implications for revenue forecasting of endogenous labour supply responses
to wage rate changes requires considerable information.
13See for example, Disney and Smith (2002) who ﬁnd more substantial hours responses by
pensionable men in the UK; and Bingley and Lanot (2002) who ﬁnd a labour supply elasticity
around 0.14 for a sample of Danish private sector workers.
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